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Contract Production 
of Turkeys 
A study of contractual or vertical integration 
in turkey production in Missouri that may 
have implications for other farm commodities. 
ERIC G. THOMPSON AND V. JAMES RHODES 
T his study presents: (1) an economic classifi-
cation and analysis of turkey contracts in use in Mis-
souri in 1967; (2) a report on the contracting proc-
ess as viewed by a sample of Missouri turkey grow-
ers; () estimates of net returns to growers, 1967. 
The turkey industry is undergoing an organiza-
tional revolution. This study is an attempt to help 
those in the industry to be better informed as to 
what is happening and what alternatives are avail-
able. A follow-up survey concerning the 1968 sea-
son has already been made. A later bulletin will de-
scribe the shifts, 1967 to 1968, in number and size 
of growers, the causes of the shifts, and their rela-
tion to shifts anticipated by growers in March-April , 
1968. It will also examine shifts in contracts and net 
returns 1967 to 1968. 
This study is part of a much larger study of the 
changing organization of agriculture. Several of us 
in the Department of Agricultural Economics are 
trying to understand the forces that are already bring-
ing large organizational changes and are likely to 
bring even larger ones. Weare concerned with un-
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derstanding the role of such organiza tional devices 
as contracts and in comparing the operational aspects 
and the performance of a "contractual industry"l 
with those of a free market of independent growers 
and firms. 
This report could have been couched in the 
terminology of vertical integration because we are 
analyzing certain aspects of contractual vertical in-
tegration. Contractual vertical integration is signifi-
cant in several areas in agriculture including broilers, 
turkeys, and fruits and vegetables for processing and 
has made some inroads into cattle and hog feeding. 
This study focuses upon the turkey growers rather 
than upon the entire vertically integrated system. 
While we cannot transplant the organizational 
changes in one industry to another, we believe that 
an economic analysis of contracting in the turkey 
industry has considerable significance for other ag-
ricultural industries. 
t An industry in which contractual relationships largely determine the /low of 
inputs and outputS and the division of returns. 
An Economic Classification of Contract Types 
A decade ago most turkey growers financed their 
own production and dealt independently in the mar-
ket place with suppliers of feed, poults and other 
inputs and, at marketing time, with processors. To-
day, most market relationships among growers, feed 
companies and processors have been altered by vari-
ous forms of agreements. These agreements run the 
full gamut from a forward sale at a to-be-determined 
price to a complete transfer of grower risk and turkey 
ownership to the processor or feed company. 
. This e.volution of market relationship, accom-
phshed dunng a period of economic duress for some, 
or all , of the principals involved, has not been uni-
versally welcomed by growers. However, Missouri 
growers generally acknowledge that "contracts are 
here to stay," and are concerned mainly with work-
ing to improve this new way of doing things. 
One of the first steps for such improvement 
must b~ a general understanding of the legal and 
economIC nature of these various kinds of relation-
ships. This study attempts to contribute toward such 
an economic understanding. 
A fundamental distinction between types of con-
tracts is whether they do or do not transfer some 
risks from the producer to other parties. It is also 
important to distinguish between two types of risks 
-production and market price. 
Production risks refer to those risks and uncer-
tainties in the production process that relate to feed-
ing efficiency, mortality, and general health ' and qual-
ity of the birds. 
Market price risks refer to those risks and un-
certainties associated with variations in market prices 
of finished turkeys. 
The following classification of contracts is cen-
tered upon the nature of risk-sharing and also' intro-
duces other distinctions. 
Type I. Production Payment 
A. Piece-Wage 
B. Relative Cost of Production 
Type II. Floor Price 
Type III. Financing 
Type IV. Marketing Agreement 
Examples of the first two types are in Appendix B. 
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Risk-Sharing Contracts 
Most interest centers upon the risk-sharing types 
of contracts because of the marked degree to which 
they have tended to alter previous independent mar-
ket relationships. While there is a considerable va-
riety of agreements, two major sub-classes can be 
i?entified on the basis of the sharing of types of 
nsks. 
Type I: Production Payment Contract 
This type of contract shares production risks be-
tween grower and contractor (feed company or proc-
essor or both), but the contractor takes all of the 
market price risk for the birds contracted because the 
contractor owns the birds. 
. A. Piece-wage. A common form of the produc-
tion payment type in Missouri states : "Contractor 
shall pay Grower on the following basis: two (2) 
cents per pound of turkey marketed (passing govern-
ment inspection) as a base payment . . . " However 
"i~ livability is less than 87%, the .. . base payment ... 
~Ill . be r~~uced 2% for each percentage point .. . drop 
lfl hvablhty below 87%." Such a payment is eco-
nomically very close to a piece-wage. This main com-
ponent of the grower's return depends not at all 
upon the price of turkeys; instead his return de-
pends upon the pounds of turkey marketed and the 
mortality rate. The grower has a strong incentive to 
exercise a level of management which will minimize 
mortality. 
This particular contract provides an additional 
type of piece wage payment to give further incen-
tive to the grower. This latter payment is a signifi-
cant premium for efficient feed conversion, varying 
from 36 cents per turkey marketed for a feed con-
version of 2.90,2 and below, to no premium for a 
ratio of 4.10 and above. This premium payment is 
subject to the same reductions for mortality as is the 
base payment. Since the Contractor owns the turkeys 
and the feed, he would be the prime loser in case of 
heavy mortality, but the grower obviously would 
also ,be a loser, and in an extreme case, would ob-
tain no payment for his season's labor. 
2 Pounds feed to produce 1 pound turkey. 
B. Relative Cost of Production. The piece-wage 
contract is not the only form of the production pay-
ment type. Another form relates grower returns to 
relative cost-of-production. A frequently used con-
tract in Missouri defines a "Flock Prime Cost" for 
the grower and an "Average Prime Cost" computed 
for all of the growers producing turkeys for this 
contractor at the same general time in a specified 
region. The grower's return then is computed ac-
cording to a formula that relates FPC to APC (that 
is, relates Flock Prime Cost to Average Prime Cost). 
This particular schedule specified a possible range of 
3.5 cents to 4.5 cents a pound (of turkey marketed) 
paid to the grower, depending upon the extent to 
which FPC was above or below APe. 
The grower's return under this form of cost of 
production contract is unrelated to the market price 
of turkeys; instead, it is directly related to the num-
ber of pounds of turkeys marketed and the efficiency 
with which they are produced. The grower has a 
considerable incentive to produce efficiently, and 
bears a part of any large losses from high mortality 
or low feed efficiency. The grower works against an 
unknown standard-an average to be computed later. 
In the short run at least, growers work against each 
other and do not benefit as a group from increased 
efficiency. Although this cost of production contract 
and the previous piece-wage contract appear to be 
quite different, they are very much alike as to the 
nature of risk sharing, and it is likely that rates of 
payment could be scheduled so that the returns to 
growers would be much the same. 
Type II: Floor Price Contract 
The second major type of risk-sharing contract 
is the floor price contract. The grower owns the 
birds, carries all of the production risks and shares 
the market price risks, so the floor price contract is 
closer to an open market relationship than the pro-
duction payment type. Comparing the two types 
from the contractor's point of view, the contractor 
takes part rather than all of the price risk and none 
of the production risks rather than part of them. 
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A distinguishing feature of floor price as com-
pared to production payment contracts is owner-
ship of the turkeys by the grower rather than by the 
contractor. A second feature is a guarantee of the 
contractor to purchase the grower's marketable tur-
keys at either a price no lower than a fixed minimum 
or at a schedule of prices related to market prices. 
For example, one contractor specified a fixed floor 
price of x cents per pound for toms plus a greater 
than 50% share for the grower of any excess of mar-
ket price over the floor price. Thus the grower trades 
part of his potential profit if market prices are high 
for a guaranteed minimum price if they are low. 
Another contractor specified for 1967 that the grow-
er would receive the market price plus ~ of the dif-
ference between it and 20 cents if the market price 
(for toms) was below 20 cents a pound. This was a 
flexible floor with the grower being assured of a re-
turn reasonably close to 20 cents-for example, the 
grower would receive 19 cents if market price fell to 
17 cents. In exchange for the protection to the grow-
er of the flexible floor, the grower gives up a small 
share of any prices above 22 cents. (See Table 1). 
TABLE I. FLOOR PRICE SCHEDULE 
Market Price Grower's Return 
(Cents per pound of marketable toms, 1967) 
24 
23 
22 
21 
20 
19 
18 
17 
23.6 
22.8 
22 
21 
20 
19.67 
19.33 
19 
A prime characteristic of the contractual way 
of doing business is its complexity. A primary prob-
lem with the floor price contract is the definition of 
market price. There are so many turkeys either 
owned by contractors or being formula-priced under 
contracts, that the market price for live turkeys is 
set in too thin a market to be treated with confi-
dence. The usual procedure in floor price contracts is 
to "define" the live price by working back from 
wholesale market prices for dressed turkeys. Four 
slightly different procedures for defining market 
prices were specified in four contracts that were 
examined. Thus, for an Urner-Barry wholesale price 
of 34 cents a pound, the "defined market prices" 
would have been 20.25, 20.40, 20.50, and 20.65 cents 
a pound under the four different contracts. Such 
price differences can hardly be ignored in a high vol-
ume, low margin business like turkeys. 
Another important complexity in such contracts 
is the specification of discounts for lower grade tur-
keys. Two of the four contracts allowed a liberal 25 
percent undergrade before applying a 3 cents a pound 
discount on pounds in excess. One contract penalized 
3 cents a pound for B grade in excess of 13 percent 
and 6 cents a pound for C grade turkeys in excess 
of 7 percent. An even more stringent contract in 
1968 penalized 6 cents a pound for all non-A-grade 
turkeys in excess of 10 percent. 
Other Types of Contracts 
The two most common types of non-risk-sharing 
contracts are used for purposes of financing or mar-
keting. Growers with such contracts retain owner-
ship of turkeys and are generally independent in their 
Prevalence of Contracts 
6 
manageriai prerogatives. As contracts of various sorts 
become prevalent, the remaining independents find 
it increasingly desirable to assure financing or mar-
kets via contracts. 
Type III: Financing Agreement 
Financing contracts extend credit from a feed 
company or processor to producers for all or part 
of the feed and other inputs. The turkeys are owned 
by the producer, subject usually to a chattel mort-
gage to the creditor. The agreement ordinarily pro-
vides that the grower use the creditor's feed or his 
processing facilities. This agreement is basically a 
money-lender's agreement rather than a risk-sharing 
agreement, but the tie to the lender's other business 
operations does alter the usual relationships, as to 
inputs or markets or both. 
Type IV: Marketing Agreement 
A marketing agreement constitutes an agreement 
of a processor to market a grower's birds and to re-
turn to him the net proceeds above processing, stor-
age and other costs. Such an agreement is equivalent 
to a forward sale at an undetermined price. It in-
sures a market for an otherwise independent grower, 
and it likewise schedules processing business for the 
processor. These purely marketing agreements should 
not be confused with floor price contracts which are 
often titled marketing agreements. 
Our sample survey of 1967 turkey production 
in Missouri found 13 (15%) independents and 74 
(85%) contractual growers. Our best estimate of the 
distribution of types of contracts is as follows: 
84% Type I-Production Payment 
7% Type II-Floor Price 
3% Type III-Financing 
6% Type IV -Marketing 
100% 
These percentages are subject not only to sam-
pling error, but to some response error. Growers 
were asked to identify their contract in terms of the 
general classification described above and also to 
identify the con tractor by name. On the basis of the 
standard contracts being offered by contractors, two 
separate estimates were made of contract types. These 
estimates agree quite well as to type, when the two 
forms of Type I (piece-wage and cost of production) 
are considered as a single type rather than as twO 
types as listed in the original schedule. However, 24 
of the 74 contract producers reported only a verbal 
agreement and several others did not have a copy of 
their contract, so there may have been some devia-
tions from standard contracts and some response er-
rors that were not apparent in our methods of check-
ing. Both the absence of written contracts and the 
lack of detailed knowledge of growers about their 
contracts was one of the surprising findings of this 
survey. 
The important finding was the high percentage 
of producers having contracts (85% in 1967). Among 
contracts, Type I production payment was easily the 
most prevalent. Moreover, about 93 percent of the 
Type I contracts were of the piece-wage variety. 
These figures indicate clearly the extent to 
which the conventional markets for live turkeys 
have disappeared in Missouri-and how fre-
quently a piece-wage production-payment con-
tract is the replacement. 
Several features of a floor price contract would 
seem to appeal more to growers than the correspond-
ing features of a production payment type. The floor 
price type leaves ownership and the predominance of 
entrepreneurial control with the grower. This type 
also appeals to the community because financing is 
left to the grower and the conventional agricultural 
credit agencies. On the other hand, growers carry 
more risks-both production and price-under the 
floor price plan than under the production payment. 
Presumably some growers consider these additional 
risks an attractive incentive, while others consider 
them an undesirable threat compared to a nearly sure 
wage. 
Why would a contractor prefer a production 
payment type to the floor price? The contractor car-
ries less risk, provides less management supervision, 
and has less capital invested with the floor price 
plan. Yet the contractor can achieve just as many of 
the economies of coordination and the security of 
sure supplies (or markets) with the floor price plan 
as the production payment. 
The economist might prefer the floor price plan 
for one or more of three reasons: 
7 
(1) It should be more efficient because it dis-
tributes economic risk in a fashion to maximize pro-
duction incentives and to motivate responsible plan-
ning. That is, production risks are highly related to 
grower care and management and he should not be 
insulated from them. Note that most production 
payment contracts find it necessary to place some of 
this risk on the grower. Likewise, the grower should 
not be so isolated from market risk that he exercises 
pressure on output in only one direction-upward. 
It will be shown later that contract growers placed 
much of the blame for the disastrous overexpansion 
of 1967 upon themselves. 
(2) A second reason that some economists, in-
cluding the authors, prefer the floor price plan is the 
better social effects of maintaining growers as own-
ers and entrepreneurs rather than as quasi-employees. 
This preference is a value judgment. 
(3) A third reason of some psychological and 
legal significance is the simplification of contracts 
which is possible when the turkeys are owned by the 
grower. Production payment contracts sometimes 
seem to have all the advantages in favor of the con-
tractor. One contract allows the contract to be termi-
nated "if the contractor feels unsafe." The defense 
has been that a contractor, like any owner, must 
protect his property. The counter-argument is to use 
the floor price contract which makes the turkeys the 
property of the grower. 
Why then is the production payment plan so 
much more prevalent than the floor price? Is it more 
popular with growers or with contractors? Is its pop-
ularity based upon misconceptions or reasons not 
perceived above? Is the production payment plan so 
much simpler that it is a much better recruiting de-
vice for attracting new contractees? Do contractors 
prefer the production payment contract because it 
gives them much more detailed control over the pro-
duction process? A strange contradiction seems to 
develop .between: 
(1) the alleged desire of contractors for detailed su-
pervision of the production process; 
(2) the desirability (necessity?) of contractors paying 
substantial incentives for good performance in 
feed efficiency and mortality, which in turn re-
inforces the grower's desire to manage in his 
own way. Numerous examples of this conflict 
over managerial prerogatives show up in growers' 
comments. 
The Contracting Process 
Ten years ago Missouri had approximately 13 
large turkey processing plants and eight small scale 
turkey processing plants. At present, only seven large 
and four small scale turkey processing plants are in 
operation in the state. 3 
Growing by contract was introduced into the 
state during the early fifties. Since then, contract 
growing has become the predominant type of pro-
duction. There are 12 major contractors in the state 
at present. The majority are feed companies; the rest 
are hatcheries or processors or some combination of 
all three. The more important firms in the Missouri 
picture in 1968 were Ralston Purina, F. M. Stamper, 
Swift, Hales and Hunter, Central Soya, and Pro-
ducers Produce (a cooperative). The big "independent 
operators" include Joe Morrow, Karl Stout, Laverne 
Borron, Norris Waite, Gene Waite, and Dale Moore. 4 
It is difficult to quantify the relative growth of 
contracting in turkeys. One benchmark is the data 
provided from the ASCS registration of producers to 
vote in the national turkey marketing order referen-
dum of 1962. A USDA study of these data indicates 
that about 25 percent of U.S. and 34 percent of Mis-
souri production was produced under risk-sharing 
contracts in 1961. It also estimated that another 35 
to 45 percent of U.S. production was under some 
other form of contract. 5 
There are other pieces of evidence. A number of 
growers have been financed by Production Credit As-
sociations, even if under contract, as long as the 
grower actually owned the turkeys. Data for four 
Missouri PCA districts indicates a growth from about 
2 percent of their borrowers with contracts in 1960 
to about 95 percent in 1968. 
Other evidence: Of the 74 contractees in this 
survey, 36 had begun producing as independents. 
About 65 percent of the contractees had started con-
tract production since 1964. One of the larger con-
• Lilt of Piant.r Operating under USDA Poultry and Egg Inspection and Grading 
Programs, USDA Consumer and Muketing Service, April 1968. 
• This listing is from a recent newsletter (Missouri Turkey Riporl, Nov. 1968) 
of Professor Walter Russell, Extension Poultryman, University of Missouri· 
Columbia. This Jist coincides with our survey findings, when it is extended 
to include such .out-of-state processors as Ocoma Foods of Omaha and Louis 
Ricn Food, Inc. of West Liberty, Iowa. 
• William Gillimore, Contracting and Other Inttgrating Arrangtmmts in the Tur-
key Industry, USDA Muketing Reseuch Report #734, Nov. 196~ . . 
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tractors in Missouri began a significant amount of 
contracting in 1963 and another began in 1964.6 
Turkey prices at farm level had trended down-
ward during the 1950s from an annual average high 
of 37.5 cents a pound in 1951 to 25.4 cents in 1960, 
but that gradual fall hardly prepared the industry for 
a further big drop to 18.9 cents in 1961. The losses 
of 1961 precipitated a search for alternatives. After 
the failure of the turkey marketing order referendum 
in 1962, growers had no apparent alternative way to 
reduce their market risks except through risk-sharing 
contracts. Various factors have been leading feed 
companies, processors and independents toward con-
tracting, or in some cases toward more contracting, in 
the past decade. 
To Summarize the Growth of Contracting in 
Missouri: 
In 1967 about 72 percent of the producers had 
risk-sharing contracts and another 13 percent had 
other contracts. Since, as will be shown later, con-
tract growers handle more turkeys than do the in-
dependents, the percent of production under contract 
is larger than the percent of producers_ These figures 
indicate an approximate doubling of the percentage 
of risk-sharing contracts since 1961 in Missouri. 
There is no evidence that the trend toward more 
contracting had yet reached its maximum in 1967. 
Motivations for Contracting 
A contract is presumably a voluntary legal re-
lationship between an agribusiness firm and a farmer. 
Some of our previous discussion has implied some 
of the motivations of each to contract. 
Feed companies and processors are motivated 
by (1) efficiencies of cordination and (2) market po-
sition and power_Contracting firms listed the desires 
"to increase volume" and "to increase efficiency" as 
their primary motivations. 7 Both the feed company 
and the processor need to use their plants at near-
full capacity to hold down their operating costs_ The 
processor who builds a new plant can use contracts 
to develop and assure an adequate supply of turkeys 
• Unpu,bJishec! data provided by Dr. Randall Torgerson, Department of Age i-
cultural Economics, University of Missouri - ColUmbia. 
7 Gillimore, up. cit. 
in the area. The selling costs for feed can be reduced 
by contracts. The struggle for market position is 
often very strong. Suppose feed mills A, B, and C 
are competing for the business of growers in an area. 
Then mill A negotiates a contract with farmer Brown 
and thus "sews up" that part of the market. Then 
mill B contracts "in self-defense" with farmer Smith, 
etc. The process can quickly snowball. 
Many growers are initially motivated to con-
tract in order to reduce risks-particularly market 
price risks. Some farmers may also contract to enter 
a new enterprise-such as turkey production -be-
cause the risk-sharing contract allows entry with a 
much smaller investment and smaller risk than would 
be possible otherwise. Missouri expansion indicates 
that a considerable number of new turkey growers 
can be readily "recruited" in a new area through the 
contract device. 
Independent turkey producers face a quite dif-
ficult market price risk situation because of (1) the 
varia,bility of farm market prices for turkeys and (2) 
the composition of input costs. While costs vary 
from flock to flock, some average figures from a USDA 
study8 indicate a cash outlay per pound of turkey for 
variable inputs (mainly feed and poults) of 18.0 cents, 
and a fixed cost (buildings and equipment deprecia-
tion, repair, taxes, etc.) of only 0.9 cents. 
When turkey prices were "good" in the 1960s, 
the independent grower had 2 or 3 cents a pound 
left for his labor and management; when they were 
"bad" he sometimes didn't cover his variable cash 
costs. When a farmer's net returns to labor, land, 
and management are 30 to 40 percent of his gross, it 
takes a similar size price drop of 30 to 40 percent to 
wipe out his net. In the turkey business this net is 
more like 10 to 15 percent of his gross and it onl y 
takes a price drop of 10 to 15 percent to wipe out 
his net. 
This greater susceptibility of turkey growers 
than most farmers to price risks is presumably one 
of the explanations of the greater amount of risk-
sharing contracts in turkeys. Creditors are as aware 
of these price risks as the growers and their pres-
sures have influenced growers toward contracts. 
Missouri Growers View the Contracting Process 
The following section summarizes the grower's 
answers to questions concerning the contracting pro-
cess. It is their side of the story and may differ at 
times from the perceptions and attitudes held in the 
contracting firms. 
(1) Why did growers decide to contract? It will be 
recalled that about half of the contract growers were 
former independents while the others entered pro-
duction as contractees. Less risk was by far the most 
important reason why independents shifted to con-
tracts. A few mentioned lower capital requirements or 
the hope for higher net returns under contracts. 
(2) Have you changed contractors? Why or why not? 
Less than half (30 of the 74) had changed con-
tractors and few of them had changed more than 
once. Of the 44 who had not switched contracts, 
only 24 had ever been contacted by a fieldman of 
another contractor and the majority of these reported 
• William Gallimore and James Ventrees, A Comparison of Returns to Poultry 
Growers, Marketing Research Report #814, Feb. 1968. 
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that they received no better offer. However, a few 
cited good relations with their present contractor as 
the reason for never switching. Of the 30 who had 
switched, 14 reported better contract terms as the 
reason, while 10 had made involuntary switches 
either because the first contractor had gone out of 
business or had ceased offering a contract to that 
grower. Contractors often talk about the many op-
portunities of their growers to switch to competitors 
-just as in any free market-but the growers per-
ceive a more limited view of their opportunities. One 
contractor reputedly has said "if you ever leave me, 
you can't come back," which is at the other extreme 
from the freedom of the purely competitive market. 
(3) What features do growers seek in a contract 
and where do they obtain information concerning con-
tract terms available to others? Contract growers' con-
cern for avoidance of risk came to the fore, because 
a guaranteed payment in the form of wages or price 
was by far the most desired feature. It was men-
tioned in 53 percent of the total responses. The na-
ture of company services and the extent of out-of-
pocket costs to the grower were mentioned in 12 
and 10 percent, respectively, of the responses. 
The four main sources of information to growers 
about contract terms were: contractors, other pro-
ducers, trade magazines, and Extension. 
(4) Is the big producer (25,000 or more birds) prob-
ably able to negotiate a better contract than the little 
grower? With two producers of the same size, can one get 
a better contract than another? Only 17 of the 74 con-
tractees thought a bigger grower could get a bet-
ter contract. Most of these 17 were small growers. 
Only 24 of the 74 contractees thought that contracts 
might differ between two producers of the same size. 
(5) What kinds of problems do growers experience 
with contractors? A majority (43 of 74) said they had 
no problems. A wide variety of problems were listed 
by the others, with inexperienced fieldmen getting 37 
percent of the mentions. Other complaints were : 
Shortage of poults at start of season 
No competition between contractors 
Not enough fieldmen to be efficient 
Market grading and weighing 
Not picking up birds when contract stated 
Given low quality turkeys 
Breaking of contract by contractors 
Transmittance of disease by fieldmen 
Fieldmen are overly protective of contractor 
No consideration for producer 
Vague contracts 
It is general knowledge in the industry that 
there was a large expansion of turkeys in the area 
around Ava in 1967 and the sponsoring contractors 
got into considerable financial difficulties with cor-
responding repercussions on some of the growers. 
Various stories of these difficulties and acid criticisms 
were volunteered by a few growers in the area. The 
problem is significant. A primary motivation for 
contracting by growers is to shift risk, but a success-
ful shift depends upon the ability of the contractor 
to accept that risk and upon the degree to which 
the contractual agreements really make the shift. 
There ought to be either bonding of contractors or 
some other public system for insuring that growers 
receive the returns due them under their contracts. 
(6) What about the division of decision-making 
power between producer and contractor? A small ma-
jority (36 of 74 contractees and 9 of 13 indepen-
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dents) of growers felt the contractor's share of power 
was too great. 
Some grower comments : 
"Your have to follow their feeding program and 
can give medicine only with their permission. Some-
times when disease occurs this can be costly." 
"It is the contractor who makes the decisions 
and you can take it or leave it." 
"They have ruined the business by encouraging 
overproduction. " 
"When you sign your contract you automatical-
ly give them complete control." 
A higher proportion of the contractees who had 
once been independent were critical of contractors' 
powers than was true for those who had never been 
independent. 
(7) What changes are desired? The only change 
desired by 15 was more dollar returns. The other 59 
con tract growers suggested a wide variety of changes. 
Reflecting the big production and low prices of 1%7, 
41 percent of the suggestions were for a cut in pro-
duction. A return to independent production was 
mentioned 22 percent of the time. Other changes 
with a few mentions included: more disease con-
trols, standardized contracts, better quality started 
poults, and more competition. 
(8) If there was over-production in 1967, what were 
its causes? (Only three contractees felt there was not 
over-production.) It's notable that more (41 percent) 
of the contractees put the blame for overproduction 
on growers' optimism than upon any other factor. 
Feed promotion by contractors was mentioned by 22 
percent, easy credit by 7 percent, and risk reductions 
in contracting by 12 percent. 
Were the growers right in their opinions about 
the above question? We don't know just how these 
decisions are arrived at. It is a question of consider-
able significance. It is conceivable that a contractual 
system is more susceptible to over-production than 
either a system of independent production or cor-
porate production. 
(9) How many growers experienced delays in market-
ing in the big production year of 1967? Delays in mar-
keting are irksome and sometimes costly to growers. 
Almost half of the growers (31 of 74 contractees and 
8 of 13 independents) reported marketing delays. 
Overproduction and processing plants filled to capacity 
were generally given as explanations. It should be 
emphasized that production was abnormally large 
in 1967. 
(10) What alternatives had growers considered before 
entering the turkey industry? 
Twelve percent of the producers did not con-
sider any other alternative but turkey production. 
Fifteen percent considered expanding their general 
farming operation to include grain, cattle, and hogs. 
Forty percent contemplated expanding some partic-
ular phase of their farming operation such as spe-
cializing in cow-calf herds or feeder pigs. Twenty-
three percent considered obtaining full time non-
farm employment while continuing to live on their 
farm. The remaining 10 percent considered moving 
off the farm and obtaining full time employment. 
Therefore, 90 percent of the pre-entry alternatives 
were such that the producer could reside on his 
farm. 
Volume of Production and Net Returns, 1967 
Missouri turkey producers in 1967 varied widely 
as to their volumes of production and the returns 
for their labor, management, and investment. 
Net returns are defined as the returns to family 
labor, management and land. They do not include 
a return to capital because depreciation and interest 
are deducted as expenses. 
Contract producers tended to market larger 
volumes of turkeys th;l: ~ ' l1dependents and to receive 
a bit higher returns. Returns to most growers were 
quite low in 1967. However, most growers had other 
sources of farm income besides turkeys and about 
40 percent also had off-farm employment. 
Information on returns and incomes is not read-
ily available. Our data tend to be a bit inaccurate and 
messy to present. The details of the returns and in-
come estimates are presented below. 
A producer is defined as a brooder if he has pos-
session of the birds from the time they are a day 
old to eight or nine weeks. The term grower is used 
interchangeably with producer throughout this re-
port. In this particular section, a more restricted def-
inition is given to "grower," and quotation marks 
will be used to indicate the special meaning of one 
who grows out started poults. To be a "grower," the 
producer must have possession of the birds from 
eight or nine weeks of age until the birds are mar-
keted. The sample included ten brooders, 70 
"growers" and seven combination broQders and 
"growers. " 
Of the 87 producers in the sample, 66 responded 
with information adequate enough to allow com-
putation of net returns for their turkey operation. 
Twenty-one did not divulge enough information to 
obtain a net return. Table 2 shows the sample dis-
tribution with respect to the type of "'grower" op-
eration. Production and net returns data are shown 
by two classes : 17 brooders (or brooders and 
"growers") reporting net returns, and 56 "growers" 
reporting net returns, while 21 "growers" did not 
report net returns (Tables 2 and 3). 
TABLE 2. NUMBER OF "GROWERS" RECEIVING VARIOUS RATES OF NET RETURN, 
AND THEIR SIZE, FOR CONTRACT AND INDEPENDENT "GROWERS,' 1967 
"Growers" Under 
Contract Independent "Growers" 
Average Average 
Comparable Number of Number of 
Net Returns Hourly Number of Birds Number of Birds 
c;:/Ib. Wage "Growers" Produced "Growers D Produced 
Negative 
Nets $ -- 9 24,515 6 ' 15,516 
• 1 c;: 0.15 6 14,809 0 
.2c;: - .9C;: 0.81 10 19,515 1 ** 
1.0c;: - 1. 9c;: 2.11 13 30,431 0 
2.0C;: - 2.5c;: 3.29 8 19,775 3 12,300 
** Data withheld to prevent identification of grower. 
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TABLE 3. NUMBER OF BROODERS RECEIVING VARIOUS RATES OF RETURN AND 
THEIR SIZE, 1967 
Net Returns Number of Average Yearly Average Number of 
~/poult Brooders 
2.9 - 3. 9~ 6 
4.0 - 4.9~ 4 
5.0 - 5. 9~ 5 
6.0 - up 2 
Size and Type Operation-"Growers" 
The average production for 1967 was 23,037 
birds9 for the 74 contract "growers" and 12,307 
birds10 for the 13 independent "growers." Wide 
confidence intervals indicate the great variation in 
output per producer in both groups, but especially 
in the independent group which includes every-
thing from small sideline operations to very large 
full-time "growers." 
Both the contract and independent "growers" 
generally produced two broods per year. The con-
tract "growers" represented in this study produced 
approximately 1,474,368 turkeys, wh~le 159,991 were 
produced by the 13 independent "growers." The 
contract and independent "growers" accounted for 
89.15 percent and 10.85 percent, respectively, of the 
total production. 
The largest contract "grower" produced 81,800 
birds in 1967. The smallest contract "grower" pro-
duced 5,300 birds. Of the 13 independent "growers," 
the largest "grower" produced 33,400 birds in 1967, 
and the smallest "grower" produced 500 birds. 
Eight of the 64 contract "growers" grew their 
birds in confinement, and all eight had positive net 
returns. One independent "grower" grew his birds 
in confinement, but he did not have a positive net 
return. 
Net Returns-"Growers" 
Cost data from Missouri Turkey Record Analysis 
1967, prepared by Walter Russell of the Extension 
Division, was used in conjunction with the gross 
returns reported by producers to enable net return 
computations to be made. 
Of the 56 "growers" reporting net returns, 46 
were contract "growers" and 10 were independent. 
• 95%" confidence interval of 18,810 to 27 ,264. 
10 95% confidence interval of 5,586 to 19,028. 
Production Broods per year 
57,417 2 
15,600 2 
19,394 1 
28,500 2 
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Nine of the 46 contractees had negative returns in 
1967, while six of the ten independents had negative 
returns. The mean negative net returns of the con-
tractees and the independents with losses were -1.73¢ 
per pound and -2.00¢ per pound, respectively. The 
range of losses for the contractees was .2¢ per pound 
to 4.3¢ per pound. For the independents, the range 
of losses was from 1.0¢ to 3.6¢ per pound. 
Mean net returns of contract "growers" and in-
dependents differed by 1.1 cents a pound, although 
the large variations in returns made the mean dif-
ference nonsignificant. The mean net return for the 
contract "growers" was .62¢; whereas, the mean net 
return for the independents was a negative .49¢ per 
pound. To lose about 10¢ a bird on a 20 pound tur-
key in addition to receiving no return at all to labor 
or land is a serious loss. 
The net returns, calculated as cents per pound, 
are divided into five groups in Table 2. Data in the 
table tell how many growers had net returns falling 
in each group, the approximately comparable hourly 
wage a grower obtained from his net returns, and the 
"growers'" average size. The data omit 18 who de-
clined to report net returns. 
The net return data were converted to an equiva-
lent hourly wage for comparisons. Labor requirement 
data were taken from North Central Research Pub-
lication 185.11 For the mid-point of each net return 
classification, a comparable hourly wage is calculated, 
assuming no return to land or management. This 
hourly wage applied to both contractees and inde-
pendents. 
It was also of interest to determine whether or 
not the "grower's" net returns were related to the 
number of birds he grew out in a year. The relation-
ship was not statistically significant. Only 6.7 percent 
"D. Lee Bawden, The Cost of Producing Turkeys: A Comparison Among States, 
Bulletin 388, North Central Research Publication 185, pp. 1-19. 
of the variation in net returns was explained by the 
number of turkeys handled yearly.12 A low net re-
turn would not necessarily be corrected by increas-
ing the number of birds raised per year by a pro-
ducer. 
Size and Type Operation-Brooders 
All the producers involved in brooding turkeys 
from day old to started poults reported the informa-
tion required to compute a net return per bird figure. 
There were 17 producers involved in brooding op-
erations, seven of which also had growout opera-
tions. Only one of the 17 brooders was not brood-
ing under contract. Therefore, the analysis of the 
brooders and their operations will exclude any com-
parisons between independent and contract brooding 
operations. 
The 17 brooders brooded a total of 560,871 
poults, or an average of 32,992. All the broods were 
brooded in confinement. The smallest number of 
poults brooded by any of the 17 producers was 
5,529, while the largest brooder raised more than 
140,000 from day old to started poults in 1967. 
Net Returns-Brooders 
The highest brooding net return reported was 
8¢ per poult (Table 3). This brooder, however, had 
less than 10,000 birds during the course of the year. 
The next highest return was 6¢ per poult, and this 
particular brooder brooded almost 50,000 poults dur-
ing 1967. The 2.9¢ return represented the lowest 
brooding net of the 17. This producer also brooded 
almost 50,000 poults in 1967. The mean net return 
for all brooders was 4.52¢ per poult. 
The question arises whether net returns in 
brooding could be a function of the number of 
poults brooded per year. Again, simple regression 
techniques were employed. Net returns for brood-
ing were found not significantly related to size. The 
regression coefficient was 0.2035, and the correlation 
coefficient was 0.3147. Both were found not to be 
significant at a 95 percent level of confidence. Only 
9.9 percent of the variation in net returns was ex-
plained by size. Both coefficients were positive, in 
contrast with the relationship for grow-out. 
Total Income of Turkey Producers 
Data on other income of turkey producers was 
obtained to give a better picture of their overall 
economic situation. Of the 68 providing net farm 
income data, 62 reported positive figures. The mean 
was $5,123 for the contractees and $3,379 for the 
independents. However, there was a wide range with-
in each group. Income from turkeys was, of course, a 
significant contributor to those net farm income fig-
ures. Omitting those with negative net returns from 
turkeys, the average contribution of the turkeys was 
49.5 percent for the contractees and 39.0 percent for 
12 The regression coefficient was - .3083 and the correlation coefficient was 
- .2652. The important thing to notice here is that both the correlation and re-
gression coefficients were negative. 
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the independents. Thesd.:'percentage contributions of 
turkeys would presumably be larger in a year of more 
normal turkey prices. 
Forty-one percent of the contractee operators 
had off-farm employment with average non-farm in-
comes of $4,047. Only four of the 13 independent 
operators had off-farm employment; their mean was 
$1,825 . 
In summary, turkey production was most often 
a less-than-full-time operation, supplemental to other 
farming enterprises or off-farm employment. 
Characteristics of Farmers 
in the Sample 
Turkey growers are commercial farmers tending 
to be much like the average of all commercial farmers 
in Missouri. However, they farm slightly smaller 
acreages, have smaller net farm incomes, and are 
younger. 
The average size of both the contractees' and 
the independents' farms was a little under 300 acres 
(Table 4). 
In general, in socio-economic description, in-
dependent producers compare with cOntractees about 
as follows: they are older, they own more land, they 
have a little more education, they have been farming 
longer, and they have a smaller net farm income. 
On the average, independent producers were 
about 5.4 years older than the contract producers 
(Table 4). Threy had an average of 11.0 years of 
education as compared to 10.2 years of education for 
the contractees. 
Generally, the independent producers started 
farming much earlier than the contractees. Forty-
six percent of the independents began farming be-
fore 1940, as opposed to only 14 percent of the con-
tractees. Moreover, 47 percent of the contractees be-
gan farming since 1950 as opposed to 39 percent of 
the independents. 
Membership in farm organizations seemed to be 
limited to the following four organizations: Missouri 
Farmers' Association, Missouri Turkey Federation, 
National Farmers' Organization and American Farm 
Bureau Federation. Many MFA members also be-
longed to another farm organization. Twenty-five 
contractees and three independents did not belong 
to any farm organization. Thirteen of these 28 were 
less than 40 years old. 
TABLE 4. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF MISSOURI TURKEY PRODUCERS, 
1967 
Contract Independent 
Characteristics Producer Producer 
Acreage Owned and Operated 250.5 282.5 
Acreage Rented from Others 45.9 2.3 
Total 0lierated Acreage 296.4 284.8 
Total Ti lable Acreage 140.7 161.0 
Total Acreage in Grain 46.5 61.7 
Present Age 45.7 51.1 
Education 10.2 11.0 
When First Began Farming # % # % 
1920-29 0 0 2 15 
1930-39 14- 19 4 31 
1940-49 25 34 2 15 
1950-59 15 20 4 31 
1960-67 20 27 1 8 
Net Farm Income, 1967 $5,123 $3;379 
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Summary and Conclusions 
A rather wide variety of turkey contracts were 
used in Missouri in 1967. No two companies used 
the same contract, and at least one company used 
two or more kinds of contracts. Since the sharing of 
risks seemed the most important economic aspect 
of contracts, the contracts were classified as follows : 
Type 1. Production Payment 
A. Piece Wage 
B. Relative Cost of Production 
Type II. Floor Price 
Type III. Financing 
Type IV. Marketing. 
The grower has some of the production risk in 
Type I, and all of it in Types II, III, and IV. The 
grower has none of the market price risk in Type I, 
some risk in Type II, and all of it in Types III and 
IV. The contractor owns the birds in Type I, the 
grower owns them in the other types. 
Only 15 percent of the growers were indepen-
dents . . About 72 percent of all growers had risk-
sharing contracts (Type I or II). This 1967 percent-
age of risk-sharing was much higher than in 1961, 
and the percentage is apparently still rising. 
The diversity and complexity of contracts and 
the use of oral agreements in numerous cases make 
communication difficult. It is tempting to recom-
mend a standardization of contracts to reduce the 
confusion. Certainly some of the diversity accom-
plishes no useful purpose. However, it seems ap-
parent that there are differences among growers as 
to the relative amounts of production risk and/ or 
price risk which they are willing and able to assume. 
If a strong producer organization were writing the 
contracts, there would be considerable standardiza-
tion, but perhaps there would still be more than one 
type. If such an organization were preparing con-
tracts, there would almost certainly be more empha-
sis upon defining the rights of the growers than is -
now the case. 
Feed companies and processors are motivated to 
promote contracts by (1) efficiencies of coordination 
and (2) market position and power. Growers are 
initially motivated to contract in order to reduce 
market risks-particularly market price risks. High 
risks discourage potential lenders, and so the reduc-
tion of risk and easier financing are associated moti-
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vations. As contracts become prevalent, market op-
portunities tend to become scarce, and so the remain-
ing independents find it necessary to accept con-
tracts in order to secure a market. 
Motivations for contracts in turkeys have been 
somewhat different from those in contractual broiler 
production. Inability of many small, uninformed 
and unspecialized farmers to take advantage of new 
technology in broiler growing has often been cited 
as a primary cause of contractual vertical integration 
in broilers. In contrast, the bulk of the turkey pro-
duction had long been in the hands of a relatively 
few large, specialized, and knowledgeable growers. 
In fact, many growers still stoutly assert their man-
agerial superiority over the contractor's fieldmen. 
However, about one-half of the present contract 
growers began as contractees, and that proportion 
can be expected to rise greatly as ex-independents 
gradually retire from the business. 
Only 30 of the 74 contract growers had ever 
changed contractors, and 10 of these changes were 
involuntary on the grower's part. Growers viewed 
. their opportunities to "shop around" and improve 
their contracts as quite limited. Most growers view 
their bargaining power, as individuals, as equally 
limited. While a significant minority say they would 
like to see the turkey industry return to independent 
production, most appear to think that contracts are 
here to stay. The gradual retirement of those growers 
who ever knew independence will presumably dimin-
ish interest in that method of production. 
Wide variation existed in the net returns from 
turkeys, within both the contract "growers" (those 
growing out started poults) and the independent 
"growers." The range of net returns in 1967 was 
-4.3¢ to 2.5¢ per pound for the contract "grower" 
and -3.6¢ to 2.5¢ per pound for the independents. 
The mean net return for contract growers was 0.62¢ 
per pound, and it was -0.49¢ per pound for the in-
dependents. However, because of the large variations 
of net returns within each group the net returns of 
the two groups were not statistically different. For 
the average "grower" to have made a minimum 
wage of $1.30 per hour, he would have needed a net 
return of about 0.88¢ per pound. 
All 17 of the brooders, including one indepen-
dent, had positive net returns. The range of brood-
ing net returns was from 2.9¢ to 8.0¢ per poult. The 
mean net return for brooding was 4.52¢ per poult. 
Economists are concerned about pricing effi-
ciency and distributional equity. In more popular 
language, they seek "equal pay for equal work" and 
"the same prices for the same products." The great 
diversity in the net returns to growers raises ques-
tions about how well these goals are met. Much of 
the diversity was presumably due to differences in 
grower productivity as manifested in differences in 
feed efficiency, mortality, and quality of birds. How-
ever, the returns of the two-thirds of the growers with 
Type I contracts were protected from the 1967 fall 
in market prices, those with Type II contracts were 
partially protected, while the returns of the others 
were affected substantially. This latter difference in 
returns was due to the diversity of organizational 
arrangements rather than differences in grower pro-
ductivity. 
It seems self-evident that efficient turkey produc-
tion requires production incentives to growers. High 
feed efficiency and low mortality are obtainable only 
by the careful attention and management of highly 
motivated growers. The floor price contract provides 
the greatest production incentives to growers of any 
of the risk-sharing types. While the floor price ap-
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proach seems to be of limited popularity, it has much 
to recommend it. A fixed, or very inflexible, floor 
price can serve much the same function as a produc-
tion payment contract, but can do it in a simpler 
and more straightforward fashion. It would leave 
ownership with the grower and allow financing 
through conventional channels of agricultural credit. 
It would tend to put production in the hands of the 
most efficient growers and certainly in the hands of 
those growers who can bear the production risks. 
We need to determine the reasons why the floor 
price plan is used less than the production payment 
approach. 
There was considerable national overproduction 
of turkeys in 1967. The industry with its high fixed 
costs and largely undifferentiated products is suscep-
tible to recurrent overproduction. As more growers 
transfer their price risks, they lose their chief con-
cern about overproduction and press hard for a full 
capacity assignment of poults. In fact such growers 
and their fieldmen tend to develop a vested interest 
in an ever-expanding production. 
Thus, the movement to risk-sharing contracts 
may be accentuating the industry's problems of fluc-
tuating overproduction. The contractors, with their 
major share of the decision-making power, were pri-
marily responsible for the overproduction in 1967. 
Appendix A 
Description of Sample Survey 
Our objective was to obtain as good a sample 
as feasible of commercial turkey producers in Mis-
souri. A list was the only economical sampling meth-
od, although most lists are a bit incomplete. 
A poultry specialist of the Extension Division 
provided a mailing list of Missouri turkey producers. 
Integrators (contractors) who were also producers, 
or who owned feed companies or processing plants, 
were excluded. Names were then arranged by county 
and those 18 counties with ten or more producers 
were chosen. The 18 counties were: Polk, Osage, 
Pulaski , McDonald, Barry, Stone, Benton, Pettis, 
Cooper, Moniteau, Morgan, Miller, Wright, Doug-
las, Ozark, Sullivan, Johnson, and Lawrence. County 
Extension Agents in each of these counties were asked 
to add or delete names from the list based on whether 
the agent thought the producer had turkeys in 1967. 
Upon completion, the list contained 412 names. 
A serial sample was then obtained by starting 
at a random point and choosing every third name 
from the population of 412. Of the 137 producers in 
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the sample, 87 were found upon interviewing to 
have produced turkeys in 1967. 
The information used in this study was obtained 
by the University of Missouri Field Research Team 
by means of a personal interview with each of the 
87 producers selected in this sample. Interviews 
were conducted in February, March, and April, 1968. 
Are 87 growers a significant share of the Mis-
souri growers? Their combined production in 1967 
was 1,634,000 birds or 14.3 percent of the 11,459,000 
produced in the state. While representing 14.3 per-
cent of the 1967 production, these 87 growers were 
presumed to be a larger percentage of the really com-
mercial growers but a smaller percentage of total 
growers. We don't know the precise totals for the 
state of either group in 1967, but we can make some 
approximations. Based upon our sampling techniques, 
we estimate the number of commerciaP 3 growers in 
1967 to have been about 537. The number of all grow-
ers reported by the 1964 Census of Agriculture was 
2,202, which was down about 50 percent from the 
1959 Census. 
13 Only three growers of our sample of 87 produced less than 5,000 turkeys, 
so our implied definition of "commercial grower" is a grower of 5,000 or more 
birds. 
APPENDIX B 
The following contracts are copies of turkey con-
tracts used in Missouri in 1967 or 1968. Company 
names, addresses, and brand names have been re-
moved. These contracts are presented as examples of 
the two risk-sharing classifications used in the text. 
TYPE I.A. PIECE-WAGE 
COMPANY TURKEY GROWING CONTRACT 
DAY - OLD TO MARKET 
This contract entered into by and between Company, 
hereinafter called COMPANY and , hereinafter called 
GROWER: 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, Company and Grower desire to enter into an agreement 
for the growing of turkeys from day-old to market: 
NOW, THEREFORE, inconsideration of the premises and the mutual 
promises hereinafter contained, the parties hereby agree as follows: 
1. Number of Turkeys - The Grower agrees to produce for 
Company turkeys in accordance with the terms and con-
ditions hereinafter set out. 
2. Poults Starts and Growing Reauirements - Grower agrees to 
start poults on the following date(s) ________________________________ • 
No other 'turkeys and/or other poultry will be raised on Grower1s 
farm unless approved by Company. Grower agrees to grow turkeys to 
age and/or weight required by Company. 
3. Equipment and Labor Costs - Grower will provide approved 
housing, feed storage facilities, equipm~t, fuel, lights, water, 
litter, growing range, shelters, fencing, sanitation supplies and 
all labor, including the prompt and efficient moving of birds from 
brooder house to range and the catching and loading of turkeys for market. 
4. Company to Furnish Poults and Feed - Company shall supply 
day-old poults and MH1~resh Company Turkey Feeds to produce said 
turkeys. All feeds will be supplied in bulk, unless ' for reasons of 
convenience or necessity Company desires to furnish feed in bags. 
Any feed left over when turkeys are marketed is to be bagged by 
Grower, weighed and checked immediately with Company Field Represen-
tative and verified by Field Representative on Turkey Record Chart 
for feed conversion credit. Surplus feed will be distributed by 
Grower as approved by Company. Title to said turkeys and to all 
feed and supplies is to rest with 'Company. 
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5. Feeding and Management by Grower - Grower agrees to follow 
the feeding and management program from time to time recommended by 
Company and to use only feed supplied by Company. If Company desires 
turkeys debeaked, Grower will debeak in manner approved by Company. 
No medication, vaccination, or treatment is to be used on turkeys 
except as recommended and approved by Company. Necessary medicants 
and/or vaccines will be supplied by Company and administered by Grower 
as recommended by Company. 
6. Payment to Grower - Company shall Pay Grower on the follow-
ing basis: TWO (2) CENTS per pound of turkey marketed (passing 
government inspection) as base payment, plus a feed conversion pre-
.mium computed in accordance with the Feed Conversion Premium Chart 
hereinafter set out. The base payment and feed conversion premium 
earned will be paid if Grower has a Livability Record (turkeys 
marketed and passing government inspection) of 87% or better. If 
livability is less than 87%, the total of base payment and feed 
conversion premium to Grower will be reduced 2% for each percentage 
point (or nearest fractional percentage point) drop in livability 
below 87%. 
FEED CONVERSION PREMIUM CHART 
Lbs. Feed to Produce Premium Per Turkey 
1 Lb. Turkey Marketed 
4.10 and above no premium 
4.05 
-
4.09 l-~¢ 
4.·00 
-
4.04 3¢ 
3.95 
- 3.99 4-~¢ 
3.90 
-
3.94 6¢ 
3.85 
-
3.89 7-~¢ 
3.80 
-
3.84 9¢ 
3.75 
-
3.79 16-~¢ 
3.70 
-
3.74 12¢ 
3.65 
-
3.69 13-~¢ 
3.60 
-
3.64 15¢ 
3.55 
-
3.59 16-~¢ 
3.50 
- 3.54 18¢ 
3.45 
-
3.49 19-~¢ 
3.40 
-
3.44 21¢ 
3.35 - 3.39 22~¢ 
3.30 - 3.34 24¢ 
.3.25 3.29 25-~¢ 
3.20 - 3.24 27¢ 
3.15 - 3.19 28-~¢ 
3.10 - 3.14 30¢ 
3.05 - 3.09 31-.~¢ 
3.00 - 3.04 33¢ 
2.95 - 2.99 34-~¢ 
2.90 and Below 36¢ 19 
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7. Poult Losses - Those poult losses on which the hatchery 
assumes responsibility will not be considered in determining 
livability, but will be deducted from number of poults started. On 
all other poult losses Grower shall have the risk of loss; provided 
however, that if Grower applies for and is accepted under Company's Guar-
antee Agreement, said Guarantee Agreement shall become a part of this 
Contract as if expressly incorporated herein. 
8. Delivery of Birds and counting Procedure - Birds will be 
picked up by Company at the Grower's farm and weighed upon nearest 
truck scales available at time and date of pickup. Base payment and 
feed conversion premium shall be based upon this weight after de-
duction of any birds or parts condemned by government in spector at 
processing plant. The live head count at the processing plant, after 
deduction of any birds condemned, will be used to determine livability. 
9. Breach of Contract, and Repossession - The use of any of 
the feed or supplies furnished hereunder for any purpose other than 
for feeding the turkeys covered under this contract and/or gross and 
open neglect of the turkeys covered hereby shall cancel all payment 
and premium clauses of this Contract and any and all obligations of 
Company in regard to succeeding bunches. Furthermore, if the Grower 
shall fail or refuse to perform any of the terms, conditions or re-
quirements provided herein, then in any such event Company may, with-
out notice or process of law, enter upon the premises upon which the 
turkeys are then located and repossess said turkeys and feed. The 
legal description of the premises owned or operated by Grower where 
the turkeys will be raised is as follows: 
section ____________ T. ownship ____________ ~Range~ __________ __ 
in the County of ______________ ~State of ______________ _ 
10. Cancellation - In the event of strikes, plant shut-downs, 
disablement of plant Or facilities due to war, storm or act of God, 
Company reserves the right to cancel this contract if turkeys haven't 
been placed in the Grower's custody. 
11. Temporary Care of Birds - In the event the condition of the 
turkeys should be such that they cannot be sold at regular pick-up 
time, in Company's judgment, or if said turkeys are not in good 
quality and finish at such time, or if roadways or driveways to 
Grower's turkey range will not reasonably permit pick-Up, then and 
in any such event Grower agrees to care for the turkeys until such 
time that they can be sold. 
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12. Effective Date - This Contract shall not become effective 
until signed by the Grower and accepted by Company. 
Date"--____ _ 
Accepted by Company 
By ________________ _ 
Date Started 
I DO I DO NOT 
ACCEPTED: 
Grower _____________ _ 
Witness ______________ _ 
Date __________________ _ 
want Company Grower Guarantee Payment (mark out 
one you don't want). 
SIGNED ________________________________ __ 
Grower 
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SCHEDULE A 
TURKEY AGREEMENT DATED ________ _ 
BROODING AND GROWING 
After processing of each flock COMPANY agrees to pay GROWER based 
on the following method: 
1. The average production cost, exclusive of grower payment, will 
be calculated for all pounds of turkeys of the same sex pro-
duced by contract growers under the supervision of the General 
Manager, COMPANY, or his delegate, and processed during that 
same calendar week, the two previous calendar weeks and the 
following calendar week. In the event no turkeys are marketed 
prior to or after flock produced by GROWER is marketed, the 
average for the nearest 4-week period will be u·sed. Such cost 
is designated as "Average Prime Cost." 
2. The production cost per pound, exclusive of grower payment, will 
be calculated for each flock produced by GROWER under this con-
tract. Such cost is designated as "Flock Prime Cost." 
3. If the Flock Pr±me Cost equals the Average Prime cost, the 
GROWER received four-cents (4¢) per pound_of turkey. 
4. For each full one one-hundredth of one-cent (.Ol¢) that Flock 
Prime Cost is lower than Average Prime Cost, GROWER'S payment 
will be increased by four one-thousandths of one-cent (.004¢) 
per pound up to a maximum total payment to GROWER of four and 
one-half cents (4.50¢) per pound. 
5. For each full one one-hundredth of one-cent (.Ol¢) that Flock 
Prime cost is higher than Average Prime Cost, GROWER'S payment 
will be decreased by four one-thousandths of one-cent (.004¢) 
per pound, but in no case shall GROWER receive less than three 
and one-half cents (3.50¢) per pound. 
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TYPE I.B. RELATIVE COST OF PRODUCTION 
TURKEY BROODING AND GROWING AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between 
COMPANY, hereinafter called COMPANY and , hereinafter 
called GROWER: 
WHEREAS, COMPANY has need for GROWER to brood and grow turkeys and; 
WHEREAS, GROWER has the facilities to brood and grow turkeys and 
desires to brood and grow turkeys to be supplied by COMPANY; 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows: 
A • COMPANY AGREES: 
1. To deliver to GROWER'S farm located at 
______________ , one-day old turkey poults as follows for 
the first year of this Agreement: 
Approximate No. of Poults Approximate Delivery Date 
thereafter for the remainder of the term of this Agreement 
in the number and at the times deemed by COMPANY to be 
best under the circumstances. 
2. To furnish GROWER the necessary feed, medication, grit and 
vaccines for said turkey poults. 
3. To provide necessary labor for debeaking, if required in 
COMPANY'S judgment. 
4. To pay GROWER in accordance with Schedule "A" attached. 
5. To supply necessary trUCking facili ti.es and supervisory 
personnel to move the turkeys at end of groWing period. 
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B • GROWER AGREES: 
1. To furnish all land, buildings, equipment, water, litter, 
fuel, labor, electricity, and facilities necessary to prop-
erly grow, care £or, and r .aise said turkeys under this 
Agreement and to establish and maintain good roads to areas 
where turkeys covered under this Agreement are located which 
are easily accessible by COMPANY'S trucks, and to pay all 
fees for a wrecker, if needed by COMPANY'S trucks on GROWER'S 
farm because of the failure of GROWER to establish and main-
tain these good roads. 
2. T? provide adequate catching labor for any loading and for 
medication when needed and to be present when turkeys are 
delivered to GROWER'S farm and when picked up therefrom. 
3. To use COMPANY products exclusively in feeding and caring 
for said turkeys and to follow the COMPANY program as out-
lined for feeding, management and sanitation, and to give 
his best care and attention to the turkeys. 
4. To keep no other poultry on the premises where the turkeys 
under this Agreement are kept. 
5. To accurately keep and to transmit any and all records re-
quested by COMPANY pertaining to GROWER'S operations under 
this Agreement. 
6. To permit COMPANY to publish the results of said feeding 
operations and any statements of GROWER or photographs 
taken concerning the same. 
7. That if any of the following acts or events occur, this 
Agreement shall at COMPANY'S option immediately terminate, 
and the GROWER does hereby grant unto COMPANY the right to 
come upon the premises where the turkeys are situated without 
Court Order or Writ, and to immediately take possession of 
all turkeys, feed, medicines and sanitation products placed 
with the GROWER and to dispose of same as COMPANY in its 
sole discretion shall determine to-wit: 
a. In the event COMPANY feels unsafe or insecure in the 
manner in which the GROWER per£orms this Agreement; 
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b. In the event the GROWER for any reason removes, or 
attempts to remove from the above-described premises the 
turkeys, feed, medication or sanitation products sup-
plied under this Agreement; 
c. In the event the GROWER in any manner encumbers, sells, 
or assigns said turkeys, feed, medication or sanitation 
products; 
d. In the event COMPANY, in its sole discretion, feels the 
GROWER is improperly or neglectfully feeding, watering. 
or otherwise caring for said turkeys. 
UPON termination of this Agreement for breach of any condition 
mentioned herein, COMPANY'S grower payments outline in Paragraph A-3 
shall not apply, and GROWER does hereby fully release, indemnify 
and hold harmless COMPANY, its ~epresentatives an~signs from any 
and all claims of any kind or character whatsoevet. 
C. COMPANY and GROWER MUTUALLY AGREE: 
1. In the event of the death of said turkeys at any time 
prior to the time they are picked up from the GROWERJS 
premises, GROWER assumes any losses due to the expemtiture 
of labor, use of land, facilities and equipment and the 
cost of any fuel and/or electricity; COMPANY assumes the 
loss of the cost of the poults and the cost of feed and 
other supplies furnished by COMPANY. 
2. It is understood and agreed that all poults and supplies 
furnished by COMPANY are, and shall remain the sole and ex-
clusive property of COMPANY. 
3. This Agreement shall be for a term of three (3) years from 
the date hereof. However, this Agreement may be cancelled 
by COMPANY in accordance with Paragraph B-7 above without 
prior notice to GROWER. 
D • INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS: 
IT IS expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto: 
1. That GROWER accepts full and exclusive liability for the 
payment of any and all taxes, including local taxes, on the 
turkeys, grit, litter, fuel and/or electricity, and sanita-
tion products, and of any and all taxes for Workmen's Compen-
sation Insurance, or Old Age Benefits, or Annuities now or 
hereafter imposed by any governmental agency, as to himself 
and all persons engaged in the performance of this 
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Agreement on behalf of the GROWER. Said taxes shall be 
paid directly by the GROWER. 
2. That the GROWER, his agents and employees shall not be 
considered to be employees of COMPANY for any purpose 
whatsoever. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this 
Agreement this day of , 19 ____ _ 
COMPANY 
By _______________________________ __ 
Witness 
By ________________________________ __ 
wi tnes s GROWER 
TYPE II FLOOR PRICE 
TURKEY MARKETING AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT, made by and between COMPANY , 
hereinafter referred to as "COMPANY", and whose 
address is , hereinafter referred to as "Grower''', 
WIT N E SSE T H: 
WHEREAS, Company produces turkey poults, operates a turkey 
processing plant and is desirous of obtaining a supply of turkeys for 
processing, and 
WHEREAS, Grower has facilities for growing and handling 
turkeys or can arrange for necessary facilities . and desires to have 
a sure market for his finished turkeys, 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, the parties 
hereto contract and agree as follows: 
1. Grower agrees to purchase from Company for cash and the 
number of turkey poults listed below at the prices shown. 
Number 
,~,., Poults Sex 
App. Hatch 
Date 
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Price Per 
Poult 
App. Mktg. 
Date 
All turkey poults delivered by Company on the same date to the same 
growing location shall be considered a "flock" of turkeys. 
2. Company agrees to repurchase from Grower and Grower 
agrees to resell to Company the finished, live, healthy, marketable 
turkeys which are grown from the poults referred to in paragraph 1 
of this Agreement. The turkeys will be repurchased by Company at 
approximately 18 - 21 weeks of age for hens and 21 - 24 weeks of age 
for toms. The exact marketing date will be determined by Company and 
this will depend upon the size of the turkeys and . market conditions. 
3. Grower is to provide and pay for all equipment, water, 
heat, litter, utilities, and the necessary feed and medications for 
the feeding and caring of said poults. When it has been dete~ined 
that the turkeys are ready for marketing, a processing date will be 
set and Company shall provide for the hauling of said turkeys to the 
processing location. The finished turkeys are to be sold to Company 
on the basis of weighing done at __________________________________ __ 
4. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 5, hereof, upon 
delivery of the finished marketable turkeys to Company, Company shall 
pay Grower a floor price which shall be ¢ per lb. live 
weight for hens, and ¢ per lb. live weight for toms. 
In addition, a market price shall be computed for the 
finished marketable turkeys which shall be the average of the New 
York Urner-Barry "inside" quotation for the week the turkeys are 
processed converted to a live weight basis as follows: 
Hens - the above-described average of Urner-~arry quotations 
less ¢ per lb. times a yield factor of 81%. 
Toms - The above-described average of Urner Barry quotations 
less ¢ per lb. times a yield factor of 82%. 
Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 hereof, in the 
event that the computed market price exceeds the floor price, Company 
shall pay grower, in addition, all of the excess in the market price 
over the floor price up to a total excess of ¢ per lb. and 
________ ~% of any additional excess in the market price over the floor 
price. 
Final payment for turkeys purchased by Company under this 
. contract shall be on an individual flock basis. 
5. Each flock of turkeys shall be inspected and graded by 
U.S.D.A. inspectors at the processing plant and .the amount as deter-
mined by the preceding paragraphs shall be paid by Company for A 
grade turkeys only. Company shall be entitled to deduct from grower's 
total compensation, as provided for in paragraph 4 above, ¢ per 
lb. for undergrade hens and ¢ per lb. for undergrade toms. 
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6. Deductions for undergrades will be made on the basis of 
live weight. The live weight of undergrades shall be determined by 
dividing the dressed weight by yield factor of 82%. 
7. Turkeys dead upon arrival at processing plant and those 
condemned under U.S.D.A. inspection at the processing plant shall 
not be considered as marketable turkeys and grower shall not receive 
compensation therefor. Live weight of condemned birds shall be de-
termined by dividing the dressed weight by the yield factor of 82%. 
8. It is understood and agreed that neither grower's 
employees nor his contract growers nor any employees of his contract 
growers shall be deemed or construed to be employees of Company, 
and such individuals shall not be entitled to the benefits of an 
employee of Company, such as, but not limited to, workmen's compensa-
tion, group insurance, vacation, pension, and unemployment insurance. 
H 
9. Grower agrees to :i,..demnify and save Company harmless from, 
and to assume full responsibil{ty for payment of all state and federal 
taxes for unemployment insurance, old-age pensions, or other social 
security legislation as to all employees engaged in the performance 
of this Agreement, and further agrees to meet all requirements that rna 
be specified in regulations now or hereafter promulgated from time to 
time by administrative Officials, including but not limited to the 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended. 
10. Neither party shall be liable in any respect for failure 
or delay in the fulfillment or performance of this contract, if 
hindered or prevented, directly or indirectly, by wari conditions of 
wari acts of enemiesi national emergencYi sabotagei revolution or 
other disordersi inadequate transportation facilities, inability to 
secure raw materials or supplies, fuel or poweri fire, flood, wind-
storms or other acts of GOdi strikes, lockouts or other labor dis-
turbancesi orders or acts of any government or governmental agency 
or authoritYi interference by civil or military authority or any cause 
of like or different kind beyond any party's reasonable control. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this 
instrument to be signed, sealed and delivered on the day of 
,19 
COMPANY 
By ________________ __ 
By ________________ __ 
GROWER 
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